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Federalism in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the European Union
Peter J. Tettinger'
A. FEDERALISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
In Europe, besides Switzerland, Germany has had a very long
tradition of federalism. Considering federalism's roots - from
The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which showed re-
markable federal elements; to the reformation process; and to the
Guestphalian peace in 1648 - I only can refer to it in general
terms .2
I. Basics
Today the Federal Republic of Germany is a federation consist-
ing of several individual states, the Lander.3 This is in line with
the German constitutional tradition. Consider the Constitutions
of 1848, 1871, and 1919 (with a harsh break in 1933: Gleichschal-
tung).
The federal nature of the system of government in the Republic
is reflected in the fact that these, after reunification, now sixteen
individual states are not mere provinces but states endowed with
their own powers. The Socialist German Democratic Republic
("DDR") was a centralized state, and reunification came into force
by the reactivated eastern Lander (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thiringen) entering
the Federal Republic.4
The Ldnder have governments of their own and government au-
thority which is not derived from the Federation. Consequently,
the individual states have constitutions with creative clauses such
as "sports have to be promoted by land and municipalities," which,
1. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Cologne, and Judge of the Constitu-
tional Court of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany).
2. See L. Hugo, De statu regionum Germaniae et regimine principum summae imperii
rei publicae aemulo, 1661; J. J. Moser, Neues Teutsches Staatsrecht, 1766 ff., esp. Fami-
lien-Staats-Recht Derer Teutschen Reichsstande, 1775. J. St. Pitter, Beitrage zumn
teutschen Staats- und Firsten-Rechte, 1777, P. II. p 17 ff.
3. See GRUNDESETZ [GG] [constitution] art. 20, § 1 (F.R.G.).
4. Einigungsvertrag vom 18.9.1990 (BGB1. II S. 889 ff.). art. 1.
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according to Article 28, § I cl. 1, must be consistent with the prin-
ciples of a republican, democratic, and socially responsible consti-
tutional state as laid out in the Basic Law. Clause 2 requires that
"in each of the individual states, counties and municipalities the
people shall be represented by a body elected by general, direct,
free, equal and secret ballot." Together these clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 28, § I represent the principle of homogeneity.6 A substan-
tial characteristic of the federal state is the distribution of the
tasks and powers between the individual states and the Federa-
tion. This competence dualism becomes concrete in the federal
constitution - the Basic Law - regarding the distribution of
powers by specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.
Concerning this matter, the fundamental provision is Article 30
of the Basic Law which states that "the exercise of governmental
powers and the discharge of governmental functions is incumbent
on the individual states insofar as this Basic Law does not other-
wise prescribe or permit."7
Related to this provision, the Basic Law contains several specifi-
cations about the distribution of legislative powers in Articles 70
et seq., the execution of federal laws and the federal administra-
tion in Articles 83 et seq., and the finance complex in Articles 104a
et seq. Some authors speak about German vertical federalism,
whereas they declare the United States' system to be horizontal
federalism. Thus, even a cursory review illustrates that German
federalism is different from the others and that it is very compli-
cated.8
II. Federal Legislation
In compliance with Article 70 of the Basic Law, the individual
states have the right to enact legislation as long as the Basic Law
itself does not empower the Federation to do so. Thus, there is a
fundamental assumption in favor of the competence of the indi-
vidual states. Consequently, in theory, federal legislation is in the
hands of the individual states. In practice, however, the most im-
portant ranges of legislation are reserved for the Federation be-
5. GG art. 28, § I, cl. 1.
6. See P.J. Tettinger, in: v. MangoldtfKlein/Starck, Basic Law, Comm., Vol. 2, 2000,
Art. 28 No. 26 ff.
7. GG art. 30.
8. See for details K Stern, Staatsrecht, Vol. I, 2. Ed. 1984, § 19 (Das bundesstaatliche
Prinzip); J. Isensee, Idee und Gestalt des Foderalismus im GG, in: Handbuch des Staats-
rechts, Vol. IV (2. Ed. 1999), § 98, p. 517 ff.
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cause the Basic Law provides comprehensive catalogues of areas
subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the Federation. Articles 71
et seq. divide the responsibility for legislation into three catego-
ries, namely exclusive, concurrent, and framework legislation at
the federal level.
Article 71 states what exclusive legislation means: "On matters
within the exclusive legislative powers of the Federation the indi-
vidual states have authority to legislate only if, and to the extent
that a federal law explicitly so authorizes them."9 The individual
states are, in all other respects, excluded from the legislation.
Supplementing this provision, Article 73 contains a complete cata-
logue of the areas of legislation which fall exclusively within the
purview of the federal government. For example, the Federation
has the exclusive power to legislate on foreign affairs, defence,
monetary matters, aviation, and some areas of taxation.
In the case of concurrent legislation, which is defined in Article
72, § I, the individual states have "authority to legislate as long as
and to the extent that the Federation does not use its legislative
power."0 Thus, with access to areas which are subject to the con-
current legislation, the Federation takes priority over the individ-
ual states. However, in the case of concurrent legislation, the
Federation does not have unconditional legislative jurisdiction.
According to Article 72, § II the federal government may only leg-
islate "if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living
conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of
legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the
national interest."1' Such a requirement can be eliminated, for ex-
ample, by treaties of the individual states among themselves. Ar-
eas which fall into the category of concurrent legislation are in-
cluded in the complete catalogue of Article 74. Among others, con-
current legislative powers extend to the following matters: civil
and criminal law (No. 1), economic affairs (No. 11), nuclear energy
(No. Ila), labour relations as well as social security (No. 12), land
law (Nos. 15 and 18) as well as the laws concerning foreigners (No.
4), shipping (No. 21), road transport (No. 22), and air pollution
control and noise abatement (No. 24).
There are other areas which fall, in the first instance, under the
jurisdiction of the individual states, but where the federal gov-
9. GG art. 71.
10. GG art. 72, § I.
11. GG art. 72, § II.
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emnment can issue regulations. Subject to Article 75, in the con-
text of framework legislation, the individual states do not have
full legislative authority so far and so long as the Federation exe-
cutes its legislative power. Legislative jurisdiction of the Federa-
tion in this area is also due to the requirement stated in Article
72, § II.
Different from the situation concerning concurrent legislation,
the Federation may not enact complete and final provisions, but
may only enact framework regulation even if the condition of Arti-
cle 72, § II is met. Framework regulation is a regulation which is
able to be completed and needs to be completed by legislation of
the individual states. Article 75 therefore states in § I that the
Federation "has the right to enact general rules"2 and in § III that
the individual states "are obligated to issue the necessary provi-
sions within an appropriate period of time which is determined by
law."'3 Framework regulation of the Federation may contain de-
tails or directly valid regulations only in exceptional cases.
Framework legislation applies, for instance, to the general princi-
ples of higher education, nature conservation and landscape man-
agement, regional planning, and water management.
There are additional areas which are in the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the Federation, namely Article 91a for joint tasks and Arti-
cle 109 for budgetary law, which are called principal legislation.
Furthermore, under certain tight conditions, unwritten legislative
authorities of the Federation are recognized.
The individual states are responsible for those areas of legisla-
tion not covered by the federal government or which the Basic
Law does not place within the ambit of the Federation. Thus, they
enact legislation on educational and cultural policy almost in its
entirety, as a manifestation of their "cultural sovereignty." They
are also in charge of local authority, government, and police law.
III. Implementation of Federal Legislation and Executive Powers
Characteristic of the federal system in Germany is that the dis-
tribution of executive and administrative powers does not follow
the distribution of legislative jurisdiction; rather, it is separately
regulated in Articles 83 et seq. of the Basic Law. The reason for
the separate regulation is the administration's concern with the
12. GG art. 75, § I.
13. GG art. 75, § III.
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difficult circumstances under which a decentralized administra-
tion can react more appropriate than a centralized administration.
As mentioned before, Article 30 contains a fundamental as-
sumption in favor of the competence of the individual states. Arti-
cle 83 solidifies this assumption in such a way that "the individual
states shall implement federal legislation in their own right in so
far as this Basic Law does not provide or permit otherwise."14 This
means that states implement the laws within their own responsi-
bility and in so doing are not subject to the instructions of the
Federation. The Federation exercises only a limited legal supervi-
sion according to Article 84, § III. It can only issue general admin-
istrative rules with the consent of Bundesrat.5 Directives of the
Federation are possible, subject to Article 84, § V, and solely in
exceptional cases. Thus, the individual states are administered
independently of the Federation. The individual states generally
execute federal laws "as matters of their own."
For certain areas, the Basic Law provides for the execution of
the federal laws by individual states on behalf of the Federation.
This "execution by the individual states on federal commission" is
stated in Article 85. By law and from experience, this means that
the individual states are supervised by the Federation and bound
to federal directives which are issued with the consent of the
Bundesrat. Whether "execution by the individual states on federal
commission" takes place must be expressly stated in the Basic
Law. Areas of application are, for instance, administration of fed-
eral motorways (Article 90, § II) and execution of nuclear energy
laws (Article 87c).
Direct federal administration is referred to in Article 86 as the
execution of laws "by its own administrative authorities or by fed-
eral corporations or institutions established under public law,"
and it means that the Federation "issues, insofar as the law in
question contains no special provision, general administrative
rules" and "provides for the establishment of authorities insofar as
the law in question does not otherwise provide."" This direct fed-
eral administration is only permitted if the Basic Law provides it,
as in Article 87. It is basically limited to the foreign service, the
labour offices, customs, the Federal Border Guard, and the Fed-
eral Armed Forces.
14. GG art. 83.
15. See GG art. 84, § II.
16. .C art. 86.
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Finally, one can say that the distribution of powers in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany is based on a functional division among
different levels of government: while the central level makes the
laws, the federal units are responsible for implementing them.
This kind of federalism in which competences are shared rather
than divided up between the two levels of government is called
"cooperative federalism." In this system the vast majority of com-
petences are "concurrent" or "shared." The functional division of
labour requires a strong representation of interests of the federal
units at the central level. Their reduced capacity of self-
determination must be compensated by participatory rights in the
Federation. In Germany this task is fulfilled by the Bundesrat.
IV The Bundesrat - a Special Federal Body
The individual states are involved in the federal system of the
Federal Republic of Germany not only by the exercise of jurisdic-
tion as stated in the Basic Law but also by means of the Bundes-
rat. The Bundesrat represents the sixteen federal states and em-
bodies the federal element of the Federation. It does not consist of
elected persons like in the United States Senate or members of the
state parliaments; rather, it is composed of members of the Ldnder
governments which appoint and recall them." Each individual
state has between three and six votes, depending on the size of the
population. The Bundesrat is not an organ of the individual states
but a federal body that exercises exclusively federal powers. In
the Bundesrat, the Ldnder are able to participate in legislation
and governmental administration on the federal level. For in-
stance, in certain cases the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary
in order to pass a bill, although the Federation is entitled to legis-
lative jurisdiction in principle. In executive matters, the Bundes-
rat takes part in the federal supervision over the individual states
and in the enactment of general administrative rules for the indi-
vidual states. In addition, it participates in the establishment of
federal authorities in the cases of Article 87.
If the political constellations in central and local state govern-
ment should differ, the Bundesrat can act as a political counter-
weight and thus as the instrument of the opposition without incit-
ing rebuke for obstructing the democratic process. This is one
point for current reform discussions because of situations similar
17. GG art. 51, § I.
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to the French problem of "cohabitation." The Bundesrat elects its
President for a one-year term following a fixed rotation schedule.
The President of the Bundesrat exercises the powers of the federal
President in the event of the latter's indisposition.
V. Judicial Power
Article 30 also applies to judicial power. Consequently, the in-
dividual states are responsible for jurisdiction in general. So most
of them (fifteen of sixteen) have created a Constitutional Court of
their own. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, four of the seven Constitu-
tional Court judges are elected by parliament for a term of six
years. It is a part-time position; so I have been able to act as a
university law professor at the same time as a Constitutional
Court judge. The judges, nevertheless, must proceed in accor-
dance with federal substantive and procedural law (according to
Article 74, § I, cl. 1). Subject to Article 92 of the Basic Law, judi-
cial power "shall be exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court,
the federal courts provided for in this Basic Law, and the courts of
the individual states."
A federal jurisdiction for the establishment of supreme federal
courts is stated in Article 95. Regulations concerning the Federal
Constitutional Court ("FCC") are contained in Articles 93 and 94.
Domiciled in the city of Karlsruhe in Baden-Wuirttemburg, the
FCC consists of two panels, each with eight full-time judges, half
of whom are elected by the Bundestag, and the other half, by the
Bundesrat. Each judge serves for twelve years and may not be re-
elected. There is an age limit of sixty-eight years.
The FCC rules only in response to petitions listed in Article 93
of the Basic Law. In compliance with Article 93, § I, cl. 4a, every
citizen has the right to file a constitutional complaint if he claims
that one of his other basic rights has been violated by public au-
thority. As a general rule, however, he must previously have ap-
pealed to the courts responsible and have been turned down by
them. The FCC also rules on disputes concerning the extent of the
rights and obligations between the central government and the
states,18 or between individual federal institutions who have been
vested with rights of their own by the Basic Law. 9 Additionally,
subject to clause 2, the FCC checks whether federal and state laws
18. See GG. art. 93, § I, cl. 3.
19. See GG. art. 93, § I, cl. 1.
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can be reconciled with the Basic Law. If the Court declares a law
to be null and void, the law may no longer be applied. The FCC
has repeatedly concerned itself with matters of great significance
as they regard domestic or international policy and of considerable
interest to the public. There is no "political question" doctrine," so
"judicial activism" is an issue. For example, the judges once ruled
on whether it was in line with the Constitution to deploy German
soldiers out of area,21 whether the "Maastricht" treaty was consti-
tutional,22 and whether fundamental protection of life can be rec-
onciled with the rulings under German criminal law on abortion.23
Independent of their political persuasions, federal governments
must bow to decisions of the eight judges.
VI. Perspectives
The real strength of the individual states lies in their adminis-
trative functions and in their participation in the legislative proc-
ess at the federal level through the Bundesrat. The individual
states are responsible for all internal administration, and their
bureaucracy actually implements most federal laws and regula-
tions. Individual state administration performs a threefold task:
handling matters that fall exclusively within its jurisdiction (such
as schools, police, and regional planning); implementing parts of
federal law in its own right and on its own responsibility; and fi-
nally, implementing other parts of federal law on behalf of the fed-
eral government. Thus, in constitutional practice, in the course of
its development, the Federal Republic of Germany has become a
state where most legislation is enacted centrally, whereas the bulk
of administration is conducted at the individual state level - an-
other point of current reform discussions.
The Basic Law emphasizes the core idea behind federalism,
which also includes the principle of subsidiarity. Accordingly,
matters should only be submitted to a higher authority if the pre-
vious one is not as well-equipped to handle them. This means that
there is a progressive scale of authorities, extending upwards from
municipalities via the individual states (Lander), via central gov-
ernment (Bund), continuing up to the European Union ("EU").
20. See f. e. Ph. M. Blair, Federalism and judicial review in West Germany, 1981, p. 25
ff.
21. BVerfGE (Decisions of the FCC) 90, 286 if.
22. BVerfGE 89, 155 ff.
23. BVerfGE 39, 1 ff.
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According to the principle of the single authorization (principle
of conferral of competences) the EU can act only in matters ex-
pressively assigned to it. Procedures and limits of the transfer of
sovereign powers in Germany result from consequences of this
state sovereignty, irreversible principles laid down in Articles 20
and 28 of the Basic Law (a federal, republican, democratic, and
social system governed by the rule of law), and an option for estab-
lishing a united Europe in Article 23, § I, cl. 1 of the Basic Law,
where it states:
With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany shall participate in the development of the Euro-
pean Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social,
and federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity, and
ensures protection of basic rights comparable in substance to that
afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may trans-
fer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat.24
In these days a Federalism reform commission, composed of
members of Bundestag and Bundesrat, is at work.2" It should have
made consensual proposals to change the Constitution in Decem-
ber 2004, but unfortunately failed to do so.
B. "FEDERALISM" WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. "Federal" Nature of the European Union
The sometimes so-called, sometimes denied, federal structure of
the EU significantly differs from German federalism. The EU
may be described as a system of multi-level governance, where
sovereign rights are shared and divided among supranational, na-
tional, and subnational (regional) institutions. Because of the
specific ways in which the division of power is organized among
the different levels in the EU, traditional theories of international
relations and European integration have difficulty capturing the
nature of "federalism" in the EU. For example, in the United
Kingdom, "federalism" seems to be a swearword, so it is not found
in any of its EU documents.
24. GG. art. 23, § I, cl. 1.
25. See the report of H. G. Henneke, Kommission zur Modernisierung der bundesstaat-
lichen Ordnung - ein Werkstattbericht zur F6deralismusreform, Niedersachsische Verwal-
tungsblitter 2004, p. 250 ff.
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It is commonly agreed that the EU has developed into more
than an international organization or confederation of states be-
cause the Member States of the EU co-operate more closely than
those of a confederation. Besides the economic union, now there is
a currency union. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Member
States maintain their national sovereignty, the EU has not be-
come a federal entity either. There were strong discussions about
whether such an entity could have a "constitution," and the com-
promise was a "Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe."26
The founders of the European Communities (now European Un-
ion) did not envisage a truly federal structure. Hence, the EU has
developed into a political community with comprehensive regula-
tory powers and a proper mechanism of territorially-defined exclu-
sion and inclusion. In the course of time the EU acquired more
and more sovereign rights in a wide variety of policy areas which
range from exclusive jurisdiction to far-reaching regulatory com-
petences. In addition, EU regulations increasingly penetrate even
the core of traditional state responsibilities, such as the police and
armed forces.
In spite of this, the EU currently lacks two significant features
of a federal polity. First, EU Member States remain the "masters"
of the treaties, in terms of holding the exclusive power to amend
them, change them, and ratify them domestically, as is manda-
tory. Even in the areas of "exclusive competences," the EU cannot
legislate without the consent of the Member States. With the ex-
ception of monetary policy, there is no area in which Member
States have completely ceded sovereignty to the EU to the extent
of excluding their direct participation in decision-making. Second,
the EU has no real "tax and spending" capacity. Moreover, it
lacks an essential element of democratic control: the composition
of the European Commission as the "EU executive" is not chosen
directly by European citizens.
Because of the inability to subsume the federal structure of the
EU under common patterns, the German Federal Constitutional
26. See P. M. Huber, Europaisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, VVDStRL (Publi-
cations of the Association of German Scholars of Constitutional Law) 60 (2000) p. 194, 196
ff., 234 f.; P.J. Tettinger, Ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung, aber ... - Anmerkung zum
Konventsentwurf eines Vertrags iber eine Verfassung fiir Europa -, NWVB1 2003, 414 ff.
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Court has created the term "bond of states" for the EU as a system
between a confederation of states and a federal entity.
27
Although establishing some important changes concerning the
institutions of the EU and the division of powers between the Un-
ion and its Member States, this situation will not really change
when the new constitution for Europe is in action.
II. Central lines of the Treaty Establishing a "Constitution for
Europe"
Between February 2002 and July 2003, the so-called European
Convention, presided over by Giscard d'Estaing, and composed of
representatives of the Heads of State and Government of the
Member States, representatives of the national parliaments of the
Member States, members of the European Parliament and repre-
sentatives of the European Commission drew up a draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe ("TEC").2" In June 2004,
the Heads of State and Government of the twenty-five Member
States of the EU agreed on a European Constitution which was
based upon this draft constitution. The final version now must be
ratified by the twenty-five Member States of the EU.
29
The Constitution is arranged into four parts. The first one is
concerned with the basic principles of the EU. These include the
common values, the objectives of the EU, the categories of compe-
tences, and regulations concerning the exercise of these compe-
tences, as well as fundamental definitions related to the institu-
tions and to certain political policies. Within this content Article I
-7 clarifies that the EU has legal personality. The second part of
the Constitution contains the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the Union, formulated in the year 2000 by another European Con-
vention presided over by Roman Herzog. ° Part three is the actual
27. See P. Kirchhof, Die rechtliche Struktur der EuropAischen Union als Staatenver-
band, in: A. v. Bogdandy (Ed.), Europaisches Verfassungsrecht - Theoretische und dogma-
tische Grundziige, 2003, p. 893 if.; BVerfGE 89, 155 (184).
28. See for a general survey T. Oppermann, Eine Verfassung fiir die Europaische Un-
ion, Der Entwurf des Europaiischen Konvents, DVB1 2003, 1165 ff. u. 1234 ff.
29. Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states, 29. Oct.
2004, CIG 87/2/04, REV 2. Do not be disturbed by different texts in steps of development.
Now there is a new count on all 448 Articles (with Protocols in addition). - For example,
Art. 1 of the Fundamental Rights Charter is now Art. 11-61 of the Constitution.
30. For German literature, see representatively S. Magiera, Die Grundrechte-Charta
der Europaiischen Union, DOV 2000, 1017 if; P.M. Mombaur, Die Charta der Grundrechte
der Europfaischen Union, DOV 2001, 595 f.; J. Schwarze, Der Grundrechtsschutz flir
Unternehmen in der Europaischen Grundrechte-Charta, EuZW 2001, 517 if; P.J. Tettinger,
Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europaischen Union, NJW 2001, 1010 ff.
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core of the Constitution. It describes the individual policies within
which the EU may act (principle of conferral of competences).
Part four contains final clauses.
1. Competences
The division of competences between the EU and its Member
States follows the principle of conferral of competences whereby
the Union can only act within the limits of the competences con-
ferred on it to attain the objectives set out in the Constitution.'
The same article expressly states that "competences not conferred
upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member
States."
3 2
The constitutional treaty recognizes three types of competences
- exclusive, shared, and complementary.
The EU has exclusive competence in a specific area when it alone
is able to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. The Member
States may intervene in this area only if empowered to do so by
the EU. Article 1-13 specifies the areas in which the EU has ex-
clusive competence. Examples include monetary policy, common
commercial policy, and customs union.
In shared competence, the Member States and the EU have
powers to legislate and adopt legally binding acts in a specific
area. The Member States exercise their powers in so far as the
EU has not exercised, or has decided to stop exercising, its compe-
tence. Most of the EU's competences fall into this category. Arti-
cle 1-14 contains a non-exhaustive list of shared competences, for
example, internal market, area of freedom, security and justice,
energy and environment.
In certain areas and in the conditions laid down by the Consti-
tution, the EU will have competence to carry out actions to sup-
port, coordinate, or supplement the actions of the Member States,
without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.
This is known as complementary competence. Legally binding acts
adopted by the EU in this connection may not entail harmonisa-
tion of Member States' laws or regulations, and are known as sup-
porting, coordinating, or complementary competences (Article I-
17). This applies amongst others to the area of industry, protec-
31. See Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe ["TEC"], art. 1-11.
32. Id.
Vol. 44
Federalism in Germany and the EU
tion and improvement of human health, and cultural and civil pro-
tection.
Apart from this classification, Member States will always be
able to exercise competences using the enhanced cooperation
mechanism. For example, Article 1-44 states that Member States
that wish to do so may establish enhanced cooperation between
themselves within the framework of the EU's non-exclusive com-
petences.
2. The Principle of Subsidiarity
Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity regulates the exercise of
powers. This means that the EU should only act if its action is
more effective than that of the national governments of the Mem-
ber States. The subsidiarity principle is intended to determine
whether, in an area where there is joint competence, the Union
can take action or should leave the matter to the Member States.
But who monitors the application of the subsidiarity principle?
The draft Constitution has introduced a major innovation con-
cerning this subject, which is incorporated in two protocols that
are attached to the Constitution. The main innovation is the crea-
tion of a system for monitoring the application of the principle of
subsidiarity which, for the first time, directly involves the national
parliaments - the so-called early warning system. In addition to
forwarding directly all Commission consultation documents (green
and white papers and communications), it is proposed that the
Commission also send to the national parliaments "the annual
legislative programme as well as any other instrument of legisla-
tive planning or policy strategy that it submits to the European
Parliament and to the Council of Ministers."33 Moreover all legis-
lative proposals sent to the European Parliament and to the
Council of Ministers shall simultaneously be sent to Member
States' national parliaments. Each national parliament can then
review the proposals and submit a reasoned opinion if it considers
that the principle of subsidiarity has not been complied with. If
one third of parliaments share the same view, the Commission
must review its proposal.
It also is confirmed that any Commission proposal must be justi-
fied with regard to the principle of subsidiarity. This allows the




national parliaments to notify publicly the European institutions
and their own governments of any proposal which they believe
fails to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The protocols
also give national parliaments the right to bring actions before the
Court of Justice, via their Member State, on grounds of infringe-
ment of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act.
3. European Institutions
The competences conferred upon the EU by its Member States
are exercised by the institutions of the EU. Article 1-19 (of Title
IV, the title covering the Union's institutions) states: "[Tihis insti-
tutional framework comprises: the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Com-
mission [and] the Court of Justice of the European Union."'
Alongside these five main institutions there are two other institu-
tions: the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. The
latter two are mentioned separately in Chapter II of Title IV, Arti-
cle 1-30 and 1-31, entitled "The other Union institutions and advi-
sory bodies." Thus, there are seven bodies that have been classi-
fied as institutions of the EU. 5
a) The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the only European institution
which is directly elected by the citizens of the EU. These elections
must be based on direct universal suffrage in free and secret ballot
and allow the European citizens to elect their representatives for a
term of five years. However, there is no equality of votes because
the number of mandates to be assigned by each Member State is
fixed in advance and differs a great deal from Member State to
Member State (for example, Luxembourg gets six seats; Germany,
ninety-nine). According to Article 111-330, the Council by Law
shall establish the necessary measures for the election of the
Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
in accordance with principles common to all Member States.
Parliament is acting within the legislative procedures of the
European Union in a gradated intensity. For "Legislative Acts"
(Article 1-34), the Parliament gets equal legislative powers with
34. Id. at art. 1-19.
35. See id. at art. 111-330 et seq.: "The functioning of the Union" with detailed provisions
governing these institutions.
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the Council of Ministers. Thus it is co-legislator in almost all
cases, with the exception of a dozen acts, where it will only be con-
sulted. European laws and framework laws will, pursuant to the
Convention's proposal, be adopted by the Parliament and the
Council of Ministers. In addition, Parliament has functions of po-
litical control and consultation as laid down by the Constitution,
such as control of the Commission or execution of the budget.
b) The European Council
Article 1-21 repeats the definition of the role of the European
Council in the EU's development, as the institution which "pro-
vides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development
and shall define its general political directions and priorities" but
states that it does not exercise legislative functions.
The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment of the Member States, together with its President and
the President of the Commission. It meets quarterly, convened by
its President.36 When the situation requires, the President may
convene a special meeting of the European Council.
c) The Council of Ministers
For each of its formations, the Council of Ministers will consist
of a ministerial-level representative of each Member State. The
Council of Ministers, jointly with the European Parliament, exer-
cises legislative and budgetary functions. It will also have policy-
making and coordinating functions. The executive powers con-
ferred on it by existing treaties are not mentioned in Article 1-21
but are found in Article 1-37 on implementing acts.
The draft constitutional treaty reorganises the work of the vari-
ous Council of Ministers formations. Thus, Article 1-24 introduces
two formations: the Legislative and General Affairs Council and
the Foreign Affairs Council. The Legislative and General Affairs
Council will ensure consistency in the work of the various Council
of Ministers formations. When it acts in its General Affairs func-
tion, the Council of Ministers will, in liaison with the Commission,
prepare and ensure follow-up to meetings of the European Coun-
cil. When it acts in its legislative function, the Legislative Council
will consider, and, jointly with the European Parliament, enact
36. Id. at art. 1-21.
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European laws and European framework laws. The Legislative
Council, which is to be set up as part of the General Affairs Coun-
cil, therefore represents an important innovation which demon-
strates the legislative powers of the Council of Ministers.
The Foreign Affairs Council will, on the basis of strategic guide-
lines laid down by the European Council, flesh out the Union's
external policies and ensure that its external actions are consis-
tent. This Council of Ministers formation will be chaired by the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.
d) The European Commission
In the draft constitutional treaty, the essential functions of the
Commission are reaffirmed,37 namely the right of initiative (in
particular as regards annual and multi-annual programming),
overseeing the application of Community law, execution of the
budget, management of programmes, and external representation
of the EU, except in the case of the common foreign and security
policy. It also stresses the principle of collective accountability
and of responsibility to the Parliament.
At present, the Commission consists of twenty members. To en-
sure operational effectiveness from 2005 onwards, the Commission
will consist of one national from each State. When the EU is com-
prised of twenty-seven Member States, the number of commis-
sioners will be capped and a rotation system based on the princi-
ple of equality will be introduced under arrangements adopted
unanimously by the Council.
According to Article 1-27, the appointment of the members of the
European Commission takes place as follows: "Taking into account
the elections to the European Parliament and after having held
the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a
qualified majority,.., shall propose to the European Parliament a
candidate for the Presidency of the Commission."38 Subsequently
this candidate must be elected by the majority of the members of
the European Parliament. The President of the Commission then
selects the European Commissioners from persons whose inde-
pendence is beyond doubt on the ground of their general compe-
tence and European commitment. The President and the persons
37. Id. at art. 1-26.
38. TEC art. 1-27.
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so nominated for membership of the Collegium are collectively
submitted to a vote of approval by the European Parliament.
e) The European Court of Justice
According to Article 1-29, "Member States shall provide reme-
dies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields cov-
ered by Union law."39 The supreme body is now called "The Court
of Justice" while the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities is to be renamed "General Court." Article 1-29
states that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall in-
clude "the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised
courts.""
The European Court of Justice "shall ensure that in the inter-
pretation and application of the Constitution the law is observed."
It therefore rules on actions brought by a Member State, an Insti-
tution, or a natural or legal person in accordance with the provi-
sions of Part III of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe ("TEC"), on the other cases provided for in the Constitu-
tion, and gives preliminary rulings, at the request of Member
State courts, on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of
acts adopted by the Institutions.
Finally, private individuals' access to the Court of Justice will
be facilitated by a provision in Part II14 that provides that any
natural or legal person under certain conditions may institute
proceedings against an act which is addressed to that person or
which is of direct concern to him, and against a regulatory act,
which is on direct concern to him and does not entail implement-
ing measures. In this way, the draft Constitution should make it
easier for citizens to challenge the EU's regulatory acts under
which penalties are imposed, even if these acts do not affect them
individually, unlike what is required under existing treaties.
One can easily discern that the EU - for an outsider as well as
for an insider - is a complicated entity, and it seems to become
more and more complicated by this Treaty. Today nobody knows
if it will be enacted. I personally am hopeful because this treaty,
conferring and confirming the "acquis communautaire," in my
opinion, is a clear step forward. I am not sure if this is to be seen
in Britain and in some other member states in the same way. The
39. Id. at art. 1-29.
40. Id.
41. See id. at art. 111-364 P.4.
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motto of the EU after all - nomen est omen - shall be "United in
diversity."'2
42. TEC art. 1-8[3].
